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This paper offers an empirical assessment of the multinational activity of European 
firms. It takes the predictions of models of firm heterogeneity and FDI activity as a 
reference to explore the characteristics of multinational firms from 30 European 
countries. We use an original dataset, based on ORBIS, which links information of 
parent-affiliate pairs of firms. Our results show that more productive firms have greater 
multinational activity in terms of both scope, the number of foreign markets where they 
invest, and scale, the volume of local sales by subsidiaries active in foreign markets. 
The estimation of gravity equations shows that country characteristics that encourage 
multinational activity successively induce the entry of less productive parent firms. We 
confirm this asymmetry for the following variables: GDPs of the home and host 
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This paper offers an empirical assessment of the multinational activity of European 
firms. It takes the predictions of models of firm heterogeneity and FDI activity (see 
Antràs and Yeaple (2014) for a recent state of the literature) as a reference to explore 
empirically basic characteristics of multinational firms from 30 European countries. 
This analysis uses an original dataset, based on ORBIS, which links information of 
parent-affiliate pairs of firms. To organize our empirical work, we take Yeaple (2009) 
as a reference. This model derives from Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and 
combines two approaches to the analysis of multinational activity: first, the proximity-
concentration model of Brainard (1997), where firms face a trade-off between transport 
costs with trade and fixed investment costs with foreign investment, and second, the 
heterogeneity model of Melitz (2003), where firms differ in their productivity levels. 
Our research concentrates on two sets of predictions. The first one refers to the factors 
that influence the scope and the scale of multinational activity. According to these 
models, there is a country-specific cutoff productivity level which determines both the 
number of foreign affiliates a firm opens in foreign markets (scope) and the size of 
operations of these affiliates (scale). The second prediction refers to the country 
characteristics, both of the home and the host country, that influence the productivity 
cutoff and therefore the decisions that characterize the structure of multinational activity 
that we observe across countries. 
With respect to the first prediction, Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) have shown the 
existence of a sorting pattern between exporting firms and firms that engage in FDI, the 
latter being the most productive group relative to both exporters and firms serving the 
domestic market. Yeaple (2009) shows that this kind of sorting also extends to the scope 
and scale of multinationals: more productive parent firms operate in a higher number of 
foreign markets and at a higher scale in terms of the average sales of their subsidiaries. 
We test for the existence of this sorting, taking a large sample of European 
multinationals as a reference.  This analysis considers two perspectives. The first one 
concerns the scope of multinational activity. We estimate the probability of investing in 
a foreign market as a function of parent firms’ productivity. The second one 




relationship between the size of subsidiary firms, measured in terms of sales in foreign 
markets, and their parent firms’ productivity. 
Concerning the second prediction about country characteristics, it is common in the 
literature of gravity equations to estimate the effect of country characteristics on 
aggregate flows of FDI activity, using either bilateral flows of FDI or aggregate sales as 
well as the number of affiliate firms operating in foreign markets as dependent variables 
(Brainard, 1997; Kleinert and Toubal, 2010). An important feature of Yeaple (2009) is 
that country characteristics determine the productivity cutoff which drives the 
investment entry decision of firms in foreign markets. Therefore, the productivity 
composition of firms with a multinational activity is influenced by the characteristics of 
countries where they invest. This is the second prediction we examine. More 
specifically, we test whether country characteristics that are associated in one direction 
with the volume of multinational activity are related to the productivity levels of parent 
firms investing abroad in the opposite direction. In short, country characteristics that 
encourage a greater volume of multinational activity induce the entry of successively 
less productive firms. If this happens, country characteristics that positively affect the 
volume of multinational activity, defined in terms of the value of affiliates’ production 
in foreign markets across two countries, should be negatively associated with the level 
of productivity of the least productive parent firm entering the host country. 
The paper offers a general overview of the multinational activity of European firms 
from the perspective of the previous two sets of predictions. We build an original 
dataset, based on ORBIS, which links information of parent firms and their affiliates. 
The sample contains parent firms with a manufacturing ISIC code as their principal 
activity and have at least one affiliate firm operating abroad that is also active in a 
manufacturing activity. The sample has 15,055 multinational parent manufacturing 
firms from 30 European countries, and these multinationals are immediate owners of 
55,583 manufacturing subsidiaries operating in 183 host countries. 
To our knowledge, this is the first time an empirical analysis of these characteristics has 
been applied to examine the features of the multinational activity of European 
manufacturing firms. The features covered in the analysis refer to two aspects: the 
hypothesis linking productivity to the scope and the scale of multinationals, and the 




the scale of multinational operations and their average productivity. As the sample of 
firms is representative of the population of European multinational firms, the analysis 
offers a portrait of relevant aspects that have recently been highlighted by models of 
firm heterogeneity and FDI activity. 
This paper makes at least three additional contributions. First, the links between parent 
and subsidiary firms are defined with the notion of “property” (the parent firm is an 
immediate owner of the subsidiary firm), and the notion of “control” (the parent firm is 
the ultimate owner of the subsidiary). We check whether results are sensitive to the use 
of both criteria. Second, the scope and scale elasticities of firms’ multinational activity 
are estimated for the aggregate sample of European firms and also for individual 
countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain). Differences across countries in the 
intensity of the relationship between firm characteristics and the scope and scale of the 
multinational activity of firms have not yet been considered in the literature. Third, we 
extend the use of statistical techniques not frequently applied in this research area, in 
particular, the use of count data models to examine the decision to open a subsidiary in 
a foreign market. Besides this, the issue of excess zeros has been taken into account 
when estimating gravity equations and running regressions on the scope of 
multinational activity. 
The results the paper shows are similar to those observed for US multinationals by 
Yeaple (2009). First of all, we confirm a positive relationship between a parent’s 
productivity and the number of subsidiaries per country as well as the scale of operation 
of their subsidiaries. There is more heterogeneity across scale elasticities for different 
countries than for scope elasticities, which probably reflects differences in the strategy 
of multinational firms across European countries. Secondly, concerning the asymmetric 
effect hypothesis, we show that for five standard gravity variables (GDPs, distance, 
contiguity and common colonial history) the (+/−) effect of a specific country 
characteristic on the level of multinational activity has the opposite effect for the level 
of productivity of the least productive parent multinational entering a foreign market.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the characteristics of the dataset 
used in the paper along with the measurement issues. Section 3 reports the results 
related to the scope and scale analysis. We use both a linear probability model for 




dependent variable: number of subsidiary firms a parent firms has in a given market. 
Section 4 presents the results related to the asymmetric effect hypothesis between the 
scale of multinational firms and their productivity. In this section, we present various 
gravity equations that pay attention to multilateral resistance issues and to observations 
with zeros in aggregate bilateral flows between countries. Section 4 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and measurement  
The data used in this paper is taken from ORBIS database of Bureau Van Dijck. ORBIS 
contains the information from company accounts or business records on more than 164 
million companies or business records around the world. This corporate database 
provides information on financial accounts and the ownership structure of firms from 
both the perspective of shareholders and the point of view of affiliated companies. All 
the information we obtain from ORBIS refers to the year 2011. 
Although ORBIS is a collection of business records rather than a comprehensive 
business register, it is suited for the analysis of multinational activity since it provides 
business information on a number of key variables and has a good coverage for the set 
of largest manufacturing companies in the OECD. An effective way to assess the 
representativeness of the ORBIS dataset for our purpose is to compare the number of 
companies available in this dataset with the number of companies recorded by the 
OECD Structural and Demographic Business Statistics (SDBS), which is based on 
official business information provided by the statistical offices of OECD countries. 
Table A1 in the Annex compares the number of large firms with 250 or more employees 
in the manufacturing sector in both datasets: ORBIS and SDBS. We take the class size 
of large firms as a reference because they are the main actors of multinational activities 
and our main population target (BarbaNavaretti and Venables, 2005). 
Representativeness is quite high, with a few exceptions. The ratio between the number 
of firms in ORBIS and the number in SDBS is for most countries larger than 70%. For 
more details on the representativeness of ORBIS, see Pinto-Ribeiro, Menghinello and 
Backer, (2010). 
From ORBIS we construct a sample of world-wide manufacturing affiliate firms that 




manufacturing industry. Papers that have used similar information to examine FDI 
activity include Engel, Proecher and Schmidt (2013), which examines foreign entry of 
French firms, and Marti, Alguacil and Orts (2015) for seven European countries. To 
determine whether an investment can be considered FDI, the OECD (2005) 
recommends classifying an enterprise within a country on the basis of the presence or 
absence of effective foreign participation in its capital. If a majority of ordinary shares 
(more than 50 percent of the capital) is held by a single foreign investor, then we refer 
to this as FDI. Following this consideration, we define two criteria to identify links 
between a parent firms and its foreign affiliates. The first one is based on the use of the 
notion of “immediate property” to determine whether a firm is a parent-multinational 
along with the set of affiliates firms which are linked to each parent company. 
Following this notion, our sample of firms considers a parent-multinational firm to be a 
firm which is a direct or immediate owner of at least one affiliate in a foreign country. 
Similarly, an affiliate firm is defined as an incorporated enterprise in which a non-
resident investor owns more than 50 percent of the capital. 
The second approach coincides with the notion of “ultimate control” (OECD, 2005), 
where the affiliate companies are under the ultimate control of a parent firm. Under this 
approach, affiliate firms abroad are controlled directly and indirectly. The condition for 
defining the path from the affiliate company to its ultimate owner requires the parent 
firm to own more than 50% of the capital of the subsidiary at every step. 
The objective of using two approaches to identify links between firms is to check for 
robustness considering two alternative definitions of parent firms: companies that are 
immediate owners of affiliate firms abroad and firms that are global ultimate owners of 
foreign affiliates. According to the first criterion, the link between the parent and the 
affiliate firm is based on a notion of property, i.e., immediate property. With this 
criterion, there is no guarantee that ultimate control is based on a European firm. The 
second criterion ensures that the subsidiaries are controlled by European firms. 
Given the two criteria, the sample contains two types of firms: parent multinational 
firms with a manufacturing ISIC code as the principal activity, and which have at least 
one affiliate operating abroad and their affiliate firms active in a manufacturing sector. 
We take the group of countries that are members of the European Economic Area as a 




Union and the European Free Trade Association. The set of multinational firms 
included in the sample is controlled by residents of 30 different countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, 
Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, 
Lithuania, Luxemburg, Latvia, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and Sweden. Because of a lack of information, we exclude 
Liechtenstein from the list of countries of the European Economic Area. 
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the sample of firms and countries used in the 
analysis. It reports information from the sample based on the immediate owner criterion 
and the one based on the global ultimate owner criterion. ORBIS identifies a total 
number of 15,055 multinational parent manufacturing firms from 30 European 
countries. These firms are immediate owners of a group of 55,007 manufacturing 
subsidiaries operating in 183 host countries. This is the maximum number of firm-pairs 
observations that ORBIS identifies. The second sample, defined in column (b), 
considers host countries that have at least 50 subsidiary firms. This reduces the number 
of firms by a very small amount: 0.8% of parent firms and 2.6% of subsidiary firms. 
The main advantage of using this sample is the reduction of the number of potential 
markets from 183 to 71 host countries. This substantially reduces the number of zero 
entries in potential markets and the intensity of estimation issues associated with zero 
inflated effects. For this reason, we take the sample of column (b) as our baseline 
sample for estimations, although we report some robustness checks with the sample 
defined in column (a). Finally, ORBIS identifies links between firms, but in some cases, 
there is no financial information for the firms themselves. Column (c) reports the 
number of firms in the sample conditional on the fact that the value of sales for the 
parent firms has to be available in ORBIS. The reduction in the number of observations 
of sample (c) is approximately 20% with respect to sample (a). 
Table 1 also provides information on the three samples obtained when the link between 
parent and subsidiary firms is defined using the criterion of global ultimate owner. As 
the figures show, there is a reduction in the number of firms. When parent firms are 
global ultimate owners, samples have approximately 20% fewer firms. This reduction is 




sequence of direct and indirect participations in capital. As we mention before, our 
objective is to check for robustness using both criteria. 
Concerning the variables used in the analysis, a first set of results refers to the scope and 
scale of multinational firms. The basic source of this analysis is ORBIS and the set of 
variables is defined as follows:  
Gross Output: measured in ORBIS by Operating revenue turnover. 
Employment: Total number of employees   
Labor productivity: Gross Output/Employment.  
Concerning the variables included in the gravity equations, the basic variables (GDP, 
distance, etc.) came from two sources: the World Bank and the GeoDist database from 
CEPII (T. Mayer and S. Zignago, 2011). The definition of this group of variables is as 
follows:  
GDPi: GDP of the European country where the parent firm is located. 
GDPj: GDP of the country where the affiliated firm is located. 
DISTij: Bilateral distance between countries, calculated following the great circle 
formula, which uses the latitudes and longitudes of the most important 
cities/agglomerations.  
CONTIGij: Dummy variable indicating whether the two countries are contiguous.  
COMLANGij: Dummy variable indicating whether the two countries share a common 
language.    
COMCURij: Dummy variable indicating whether the two countries share a common 
currency. 
COMCOLij: Dummy variable indicating whether the two countries have ever had a 
colonial link.  





3. The scope and scale of multinational activity 
In this section, we report two different types of results. The first set of results is related 
to the scope prediction of multinational activity: more productive firms have greater 
multinational activity. We examine this prediction by taking the foreign investment 
behavior of individual European manufacturing firms as a reference. The second set of 
results examines the scale hypothesis: the relationship between the affiliate’s local sales 
in foreign markets and its parent firm’s productivity. 
 
3.1 Scope 
First we provide estimations of the propensity of European firms to invest in any given 
foreign country as a function of the parent firm’s productivity.  Following Yeaple 
(2009), and for ease of comparison, we start with a simple linear probability model. The 
specification is: 
(1) 
where  is a variable equal to one if a parent firm  from country  has one or more 
subsidiary firms in country  and zero otherwise;  is the natural logarithm of 
labor productivity of the parent firm from country i investing in country j;  represents 
sectorial fixed effects captured by industry dummies defined at the four-digit level;  
represents home country fixed effects and  host country fixed effects. 
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation of equation (1) by OLS. On the left-hand 
side panel of Table 2, parent firms from country i are immediate owners of  subsidiary 
firms in country j, in both cases in the manufacturing sector. On the right-hand side 
panel of Table 2, similar estimates of equation (1) are presented for parent firms that are 
global ultimate owners of foreign affiliates. Both concepts, immediate owner and global 
ultimate owner, have been defined in Section 2. 
Parent firm size as proxied by sales is positive and significant, indicating that larger 
multinational firms are more likely to own an affiliate in any given country. The 
magnitude of the coefficient, 0.01, indicates that a 1% increase in size raises the 




an intuition of this magnitude, doubling the size of the firm increases the probability by 
0.01 points, and given that the average probability is around 0.04, doubling the size 
increases the probability by 25%. The coefficient is slightly lower than the coefficient 
reported by Yeaple (2009) for US multinationals, where the magnitude of the 
coefficient is 0.03. 
The results presented in columns 2 of Table 2 correspond to the specification using the 
logarithm of parent firms’ labor productivity as the explanatory variable. Although size 
is a sufficient statistic for productivity in standard models of heterogeneous firms 
(Melitz, 2003), here we also include a direct measure of firm productivity. This measure 
is positive and statistically significant, indicating that more productive firms are more 
likely to own an affiliate in a given foreign country. The coefficient is slightly lower 
than the one reported for size measured with firm sales. 
Previous estimations are repeated in the right-hand side panel of Table 2. This time the 
link between parent and affiliate firms is defined with the criterion of global ultimate 
owner. Results are very similar and the magnitude of the coefficients is larger using the 
criteria of global ultimate owner instead of using the criteria of immediate owner. 
Although it is difficult to interpret this difference as the composition of both samples is 
different, it might be reflecting the fact that in the sample where parent firms have 
ultimate control over affiliates, we are able to better capture the decisions linking both 
groups of firms. 
A natural alternative to the estimation of equation (1) is to consider the number of 
subsidiary firms a parent firm has in a given market as the dependent variable. As 
Figure 1 suggests, our sample of observations is concentrated on a few small discrete 
values, mainly 0, 1 and 2. The 12,057 parent firms in the sample and the set of possible 
host country destinations make a total sample of 843,994 observations. Of these, 96% 
are zeros (no single subsidiary owned by firm f from home country i opens a subsidiary 
firm in host market j), 3% corresponds to firms with one subsidiary, 0.6% corresponds 
to two subsidiaries and the rest correspond to a few additional integers. 
Given that the response variable is discrete, the distribution places probability mass at 




values, the natural place to start are count data models (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). 
Therefore, our basic specification is: 
                         (2) 
where  is the number of subsidiary firms owned by a parent firm  from country  in 
market , and the left-hand side variables are the same as in equation (1). This is the 
classical Poisson regression model. 
Two issues associated with the estimation of equation (2) are considered (see Miguélez 
and Moreno, 2013, for a similar application in the geography of innovation). The first 
issue refers to the assumption Poisson regression makes: the mean and the variance are 
the same. For count data, the variance usually exceeds the mean, a feature called over-
dispersion. The consequence of over-dispersion is the underestimation of standard 
errors (Cameron and Trevidi, 2005). The strategy to address over-dispersion is to 
modify the Poisson model, estimating a Negative Binomial regression. The second issue 
is termed the excess zeros problem, when there are more zeros in the data than the 
Poisson predicts. In this case, a modified model is called the zero inflated model, both 
in the Poisson version (ZIP) and the Negative Binomial (ZINP). These latter models 
complement a count density with a binary process. If the binary process takes the value 
0, then our count variable is N= 0, and if the binary process takes the value 1, then 
variable N = 1, 2,…(Cameron and Trevidi, 2005). Table 3 reports four estimations that 
correspond respectively to the Poisson and the Negative Binomial models (PML and 
NBML) and to their zero inflated versions: Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIPML) and Zero 
Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINBML). 
Table 3 reports various over-dispersion tests. The first one corresponds to the direct 
estimation of parameter α incorporated into the Negative Binomial. In both columns two 
and four, the coefficient α is significantly different from zero. The second test is the LR 
test of α = 0, which largely rejects the null hypothesis of no over-dispersion. Therefore, 
both tests lead to the conclusion that the Negative Binomial models are preferred to 
Poisson models. 
Vuong statistics are also reported for the zero inflated versions of both Poisson and 




given the high proportion of zeros in our dataset. Therefore, statistical tests point out 
that column (4) reporting the ZINBML is the preferred specification for examining the 
influence of parent productivity on the count variable:  . 
In the upper part of column (4), Table 3, the elasticity between parent firm productivity 
and the number of subsidiaries entering a given foreign market appears (as the variable 
is expressed in logarithms, the estimated coefficient can be interpreted as an elasticity, 
Cameron and Trevidi, 2005). According to the estimator, a 1% increase in a firm’s 
productivity increases the number of subsidiaries abroad by 0.1%. 
Column (4) also reports the estimation for the complementary model predicting zeros. 
For this auxiliary equation the following three variables are included as explanatory 
variables: the Total number of subsidiary firms owned by firm f, the GDP of host 
country and the Distance between the home and the host countries. The signs of the 
estimated coefficients are as expected (notice that as the model is predicting zeros, the 
sign of the coefficients goes in the opposite direction relative to the usual presentation). 
The higher the total number of subsidiaries owned by the parent firms and the higher the 
level of the host country’s GDP, the lower the probability of observing zero subsidiaries 
in a given host country. With respect to distance between the home and the host 
countries, a positive effect is obtained, as expected. 
Overall, the results presented suggest that for European multinational firms, the number 
(scope) of their affiliate firms is positively influenced by the size and the productivity of 
their parent firms. These results are similar to those obtained for US multinationals by 
Yeaple (2009). Figure 2 summarizes this strong relationship between a parent firm’s 
productivity and the number of subsidiary firms it owns. This positive relationship is 
also very intense for the size of parent firms. 
Figure 3 draws a scatter diagram across countries on the relationship between average 
firm productivity of multinationals and the average number of subsidiary firms. As 
expected, this relationship is positive: countries with a higher average productivity of 
their parent multinationals have a higher average number of subsidiaries per firms in a 
given market. Figure 3 suggests that a certain degree of heterogeneity across countries 
might exist in the elasticity between productivity and the number of subsidiaries. Next, 




Table 4 reports the elasticities estimated for four different European countries: France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain. We choose this group of countries because they have a large 
number of parent and subsidiary firms, and have good coverage in ORBIS. The 
elasticities are obtained by estimating equations (1) and (2) with the observations of 
parent firms from each country and their subsidiaries. All estimates are obtained using 
the criteria of immediate owner to define the link between parent and subsidiary firms. 
The upper panel of Table 4 reports the elasticities for the dependent variable DNij. The 
most interesting result from Table 4 is the existence of systematic differences across 
countries in the magnitude of these elasticities between the level of firm productivity 
and the number of subsidiaries owned in foreign markets. Taking the linear probability 
model as a reference, the country with the highest elasticity is Germany, followed by 
France, Italy and, finally, Spain. 
Very similar results are obtained when estimating the elasticities, not in terms of the 
probability of opening a subsidiary abroad, but in terms of the number of subsidiaries 
abroad in a given market (Nij). The lower panel of Table 4 reports the zero inflated 
versions of Poisson (ZIPML) and Negative Binomial (ZINBML) estimators. In general 
terms, both estimators reproduce differences across countries which are very similar to 
those reported for the linear probability model, especially in terms of the ranking across 
countries. 
3.2 Scale  
The second set of results concerns the scale of multinational activity. The objective here 
is to examine the relationship between the scale of operations of multinational firms, in 
terms of a subsidiary’s sales in the host country, and the productivity of the parent 
firms. The specification is: 
        (3) 
where   is the level of aggregate sales in market  of subsidiary firms owned by a 
parent firm from country , and the right-hand side variables are the same as in 
equation (2).  
The presentation of results follows a pattern similar to those in previous section. Table 5 




foreign affiliate’s sales on the logarithm of the parent firm’s sales. Controls for industry 
and country fixed effects are included. In the case of country effects, we control for both 
the country of origin of the foreign investment and the country of destination. The 
estimated elasticity across all European parent and subsidiary firms implies that for a 
1% increase in the size of the parent firm, the size of the affiliate increases by almost 
0.3%.  
The second row shows the results when a direct measure of the parent firm’s 
productivity is included in the right-hand side of equation (3). The coefficient is 
statistically significant and indicates that the size of affiliate firms is increasing in their 
parent productivity. The magnitude of the elasticity is similar, 0.3, to the elasticity 
obtained for parent firm size. 
The right-hand side panel of Table 5 repeats previous estimations, taking into 
consideration that parent firms are global ultimate owners of subsidiary firms instead of 
immediate owners. Results are very similar to those obtained when the parent firm is an 
immediate owner of the subsidiary firm. 
Do we find a similar positive relationship between the labor productivities of parent and 
subsidiary firms?  We do not report the results in Table 5, but this hypothesis is 
confirmed. The positive relationship between the scale of operations of subsidiary firms 
and their parent firms’ productivity also extends to the relationship between the 
productivity of both parent and subsidiary firms. Coefficients remain positive and 
significant when introducing controls for industry and country fixed effects. 
As in the previous section, we report the elasticities estimated for the group of four 
countries: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Table 6 reports these elasticities. There is 
more heterogeneity across scale elasticities than across scope elasticities. Estimated 
values range from 0.49 to 0.15 when using labor productivity of the parent firms. These 
differences across countries might be reflecting differences in the strategy of 
multinational firms. Surprisingly, the lowest estimated value corresponds to Germany, 
indicating that the scale of foreign subsidiaries is lower for a given size and productivity 




Overall, the results presented in this section suggest that the size (scale) of European 
multinational firms’ affiliate firms is positively influenced by the size and the 
productivity of their parent firms. These results are similar to those obtained for US 
multinationals by Yeaple (2009). We find significant heterogeneity across countries in 
the estimated elasticities. 
 
4. Country characteristics and the structure of multinational activity  
(this section has not been included) 
5. Conclusions  
This paper offers an empirical assessment of the multinational activity of European 
firms. It takes the predictions of models of firm heterogeneity and FDI activity as a 
reference to empirically explore some basic characteristics of multinational firms from 
30 European countries. We use an original dataset, based on ORBIS, which links 
information of parent-affiliate pairs of firms. 
These results are similar to those observed for US multinationals by Yeaple (2009). 
Concerning scope elasticity, the relationship between a parent’s productivity and the 
number of subsidiaries per country, we estimate that doubling the size of the firm 
increases the probability by 0.01 points, and given the average probability, this implies 
an increase of 25%.  This is an average value across European firms with multinational 
activity. The estimation of this elasticity for individual countries shows the existence of 
systematic differences across countries. Concerning scale elasticity, an increase of 1% 
in parent firms’ productivity increases affiliate sales in foreign markets by 0.3%. There 
is more heterogeneity across scale elasticities for different countries than for scope 
elasticities. This might be reflecting differences in the strategy of multinational firms 
across European countries. 
A second set of results refers to the relationship between country characteristics and the 
structure of multinational activity. We estimate gravity equations with the objective of 
testing the basic prediction that those country characteristics that positively (negatively) 
affect the level of multinational activity, in terms of subsidiary sales, should be 




parent firm entering the market. In short, country characteristics that encourage 
multinational activity successively induce the entry of less productive parent firms. We 
confirm this asymmetry for five standard gravity variables: the GDP of the host country, 
the GDP of the home country, the distance between home-host countries, the existence 
of contiguity (sharing a common land border) and sharing a common colonial history. 
Our results are robust to the control of ‘multilateral resistance’ when estimating gravity 
equations. Although in this case we have to restrict ourselves only to the consideration 
of bilateral country characteristics, we confirm that distance, contiguity, common 
colonial history and common language appear, respectively, with opposite signs (+/−) in 
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Number of:  (a)      (b)       (c)    (a)      (b)       (c) 
Parent firms  15,055  14,934  12,057    4,134  4,073  3,240 


































Home country fixed effect  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Host country fixed effect  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
           
R‐Squared  0.0768  0.0693    0.1082  0.0879 
N. of observations   843,994  760,413    191,162  175,586 
N. of home countries  30  30    30  30 
N. of host countries  71  71    60  60 































Home country fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Host country  fixed effect  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 




















  Home country FE      Yes  Yes 



















N. of observations   760,413  760,413  749,550  749,550 
Log‐likelihood  ‐146,553.8  ‐129,143.6  ‐114,398.2  ‐110,484.7 
 
Notes: in parentheses are standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity of estimated coefficients. Superscripts ***, 
** and *  indicate  significance at  the 1, 5 and 10 percent  confidence  levels,  respectively. PPML, Poisson pseudo‐









































































Notes: The elements of  this  table provide  the coefficients  estimated  from equations  (1) and  (2). Each element 
corresponds  to  a  different  regression.  All  the  regressions  contain  host  country  fixed  effects  and  industry  fixed 
effects. In parentheses are standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity of estimated coefficients. Superscripts ***, 




























Home country fixed effect  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Host country fixed effect  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effect  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
           
R‐Squared  0.2782  0.2322    0.3216  0.2917 

































Notes: Each element of  this  table  reproduces  the  coefficient  of equations  (3) estimated by OLS  in a different 
regression.  All  the  regressions  contain  host  country  fixed  effects  and  industry  fixed  effects.  In  parentheses  are 
standard  errors  robust  to  heteroskedasticity  of  estimated  coefficients.  Superscripts  ***,  **  and  *  indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence levels, respectively.  
 
